Analysis of Austrian Negotiation Experiences: A Descriptive Profile

Bertram I. Spector
Daniel Druckman

Final Technical Report
under Contract No. GZ.308.920/3-IV/3/93

September 1994

Abstract

This study seeks to identify, characterize, and distinguish typical Austrian negotiating behaviors in international fora. Two compatible approaches are used. The first is an *introspective method* in which a group of Austrian diplomats were asked to reflect on their experiences in a wide range of negotiation situations in order to characterize their perceptions of the Austrian national approach. The second technique is a more *systematic observational method* in which many key attributes across a large number of negotiation cases were classified and structured into a data base that was then analyzed in a comparative fashion across cases. Twenty four extended interviews with senior Austrian negotiators were conducted to capture their observations in 24 different negotiation cases. These cases were analyzed and a descriptive profile of Austrian negotiators was generated that exhibits clearly recurrent and pervasive behaviors. An additional 15 non-Austrian negotiation cases were collected, coded, and contrasted with this Austrian data base to determine if Austrians display significantly different negotiating behaviors than would be expected from diplomats socialized into a universal negotiation culture.

Both the statistical and descriptive results reveal a rather active, cooperative, and effective Austrian profile. Austrians characteristically assign experienced negotiators who form cohesive delegations that operate in a decentralized fashion. They are clearly focused on identified objectives and key issues on which there is basic consensus among involved domestic agencies. Austrian negotiating teams typically are adequately prepared, receive sufficient information, and have the attention of high level Austrian officials who regularly track the negotiations. Austrians generally acknowledge that they are less powerful than their counterparts in a negotiation and, perhaps for that very reason, they operate within the negotiation process in a cooperative manner.

Austrians are problem-solvers and seek consensus both at home and at the bargaining table. They study issues and search for solutions that are mutually acceptable, rather than seek win-lose outcomes. Austrians tend to be pragmatic, not ideological, negotiators, which make them flexible and willing to accept partial solutions when necessary instead of no agreement at all. Their aim is not necessarily "win-win," but "no lose." At the same time, Austrian negotiators are willing to "hang tough" and play tactically and competitively when the issues are strongly salient and the stakes for Austria are high. Austrian negotiators operate mainly through informal channels with other delegations and actively seek to develop coalitions and maintain friendly relations that facilitate joint problem-solving and search activities. As a small and neutral Western nation, such a negotiating approach is not unexpected for Austria. It is an uncontroversial, work-within-the-system, style. Given the power

asymmetry it typically faces in international negotiation fora, Austria, as perhaps do other small nations, seeks to promote and maximize its national interests through this non-aggressive, informal, and problem-solving approach.

Austria's approach appears to have a positive and conciliatory effect on the outcome of negotiations. Austrian negotiating behavior is correlated with binding treaties and commitments, but commitments that only partially resolve the issues or problems at hand. Partial agreements are often sought because they can avert stalemate and institute a post-agreement dialogue. Austria's negotiating conduct is well suited for this post-agreement process as well.

In addition to these substantive conclusions, the methodology tested in this study appears to offer a promising approach to identify and describe national negotiating profiles systematically. Such information can help negotiators prepare their strategies and plan their responses to offers and proposals brought to the bargaining table. The methodology can also be used as a valuable tool in the training of professional negotiators and diplomats.

Preface

This final report describes the results of a study entitled "Analysis of Austrian Negotiation Experiences" which was supported by the Austrian Federal Ministry for Science and Research under Contract No. GZ.308.920/3-IV/3/93 to the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. Dr. Spector is currently the Director of the Center for Negotiation Analysis, Potomac, Maryland (USA) and a Fellow of the Foreign Policy Institute of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC (USA). Dr. Druckman is Principal Study Director at the National Research Council/National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC (USA) and Adjunct Professor of Conflict Resolution at George Mason University.

The project was undertaken in collaboration with Prof. Gerhard Hafner, Institute for International Law and International Relations, Vienna. Several others offered valuable ideas and assistance during the course of the work, including Ambassador Paul Leifer, Diplomatic Academy, Vienna; Ambassador Winfried Lang, Austrian Foreign Affairs Ministry; Dr. Gerhard Loibl, Institut für Völkerrecht, University of Vienna; Dr. Paul Luif, Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Laxenburg; Dr. Tibor Vasko, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg; Professor Christoph Schreuer, School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC; and Dr. Leopold Ziegler, Austrian Embassy, Washington, DC. In addition, we are indebted to the many high level Austrian and non-Austrian government officials, diplomats, and negotiators who very willingly shared with us their knowledge and experience of the negotiation process. Our pledge to maintain their anonymity prevents us from personally thanking each of them here.

We especially wish to thank the Austrian Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs, Botschafter Dr. Wolfgang Schallenberg, for graciously providing access to personnel in the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

We would also like to recognize Ulrike Neudeck of IIASA for all her help in supporting the administration of the project over the past few years. Finally, the authors wish to acknowledge the support of the Foreign Policy Institute of the School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC for providing excellent research facilities in which to conduct the project.

Despite the assistance of all of these individuals and organizations, the opinions, findings, conclusions, and errors expressed herein are solely those of the authors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

When negotiators sit down at the international bargaining table, they typically bring with them certain stereotypes about their counterparts' negotiating style. For example, Russian negotiators will be tough, aggressive and confrontational bargainers who view the negotiation engagement as a struggle for power and influence. Japanese negotiators will minimize conflict through informal consultations, but maintain a rigid and inflexible position with seemingly no latitude to strike a deal. Chinese negotiators will cultivate relationships with other negotiators to manipulate a sense of obligation from them in future bargaining (Binnendijk, 1987). Images such as these assign national negotiators to convenient, but oversimplistic, stylistic categories. Despite their simplistic nature, such categories help negotiators plan their reactions to proposals, anticipate offers and demands from the other side, develop counteroffers, and adjust their own approach to the talks, all toward achieving the goal of finding mutually acceptable solutions.

These stereotypes can often shape the prenegotiation environment (Zartman, 1989). Without an expectation of how the other national negotiators will act and react at the table, planners would not be able to assess the risks of involvement in future negotiations, the costs and benefits of certain concessions and possible agreements, likely responses to offers, fruitful problem-solving approaches, the prospects for building coalitions, and the utility of confidence building measures.

But is this planning well served by stereotypic images of the other side? National negotiating motives and behavior are usually more complex than can be explained by these simplistic, often single trait, descriptions of negotiator behavior. Are there more

systematic and reliable ways to identify and describe national negotiating style that have their basis in the analysis of behavioral patterns? This report examines the negotiating experience of one country, Austria, with the dual goal of characterizing a typical Austrian negotiating profile based on its behavior and testing an analytical methodology that can evaluate and distinguish such behavior in a systematic way.

NEGOTIATING STYLE AND BEHAVIORS

Do countries exhibit distinct patterns of international negotiating, and if so, how can they be characterized? For example, are there persistent and recurring patterns of how national negotiators perceive and manage issues, plan and take positions, view the other side(s), react to the negotiation setting, use tactics and strategies, and work toward achieving mutually acceptable outcomes?

If there are national ways of negotiating, they need not be unique, they just need to demonstrate characteristic behavior patterns. Broadly stated, trends in negotiating conduct consist of two categories -- patterns of perception *and* patterns of behavior: how negotiators perceive themselves, others and the situation, *and* what they do and how they react. Thus, national negotiating patterns characterize, in general, how national negotiators are likely to think and behave in negotiation settings. There may be several variations on the general pattern; for example, behavior may differ in particular ways in large multilateral negotiations, bilateral negotiations, and informal negotiations. But if a pattern indeed exists, it is usually demonstrated through recurring examples across situations or distinctive ways of reacting to different situations.

Identifying a general pattern of negotiating behavior can be an elusive task. Such behavioral patterns reflect the persistent, pervasive, distinctive and characteristic ways that countries perform in negotiations; but it is hard, without observing a country's delegations over a long period of time and in many different negotiation situations, to put one's finger on what makes a country's approach to negotiation characteristic and distinctive. On the other hand, it is relatively easy to label and categorize a country with a certain *style*, and thereby, to reduce the complexity of the negotiation process. For example, analysts and participants may pigeonhole another country's negotiators as being overly rigid and inflexible or as overly competitive and win-lose oriented. These characterizations may be convenient but are usually unfair and simplistic assessments of the way a country's diplomats negotiate. They represent perceived *style*, the stereotypic images of negotiation behavior, not the patterned behavior itself.

It is easy to confuse actual negotiating behavior with such stylistic stereotypes. A stereotype is a mental image that represents an oversimplified opinion or affective judgment about some thing or some group. The major distinguishing characteristic of a stereotype is that it is based on attitude and opinion; certainly, those attitudes may have referents in fact, but they are reduced, and perhaps distorted, to their simplest, and often single-trait, terms. Behavioral patterns, on the other hand, describe the generally recurrent actions that have been observed empirically. They describe, in general, how a person or group behaves and thinks in a particular situation. Although stereotypes and behavioral trends both seek to identify common patterns, behavior is often a complex mixture of attributes while stereotypes usually eliminate the complexity to produce a simple and straightforward, though flawed, description.

Descriptions of *national negotiating styles* are also often closely linked to *national cultural characteristics*. Faure and Sjöstedt (1993:3) provide a working definition of culture as "a set of shared and enduring meanings, values, and beliefs that characterize national, ethnic, or other groups and orient their behavior." It is an all-encompassing phenomenon that influences human behavior and, reflexively, is influenced by it. Culture can condition how national diplomats perceive the challenge of joint decision making and how they respond to it. Kimmel (1994), for example, traces the negotiating behavior of American diplomats to several basic assumptions and values about problem-solving and communicating with others that are culturally imbued.[1] The mixture of sympathetic and conflicting cross-cultural orientations at the negotiating table can influence greatly the course of the negotiation process and outcome (Cohen, 1991; see also Druckman and Hopmann, 1989, for a review of the relevant experimental literature, especially pages 131 onward). Negotiation style often assumes a cultural explanation.

A negotiating behavior pattern can be described as a much more constrained, but concrete phenomenon than culture. While national negotiation approaches are certainly influenced by cultural norms and by socialized principles of problem-solving, relationship building, and reactions to conflict, negotiation behavior can be defined simply as the *outcome* of that

[1] For example, the behavior of US negotiators, according to Kimmel, is strongly influenced by certain cultural values: that "Time is a precious commodity,... specialization is desirable,... individuals control their destinies,... what works is good,... conflicts can be resolved through democratic processes,... everyone should have an equal opportunity to develop their abilities,... authority is resisted (while) independence is valued,... (and) one must compete with others to get ahead." (p. 182)

acculturation and socialization. Culture is the context in which negotiating behavior occurs; it influences behavior but is not equivalent to the behavior (Druckman and Hopmann, 1989). As indicated earlier, negotiating behavior patterns are identified as the distinctive and recurrent way in which national diplomats perceive and behave; they are physically observable and measurable, whereas cultural effects often defy clear detection. A negotiating behavior pattern can be designated as the empirically identifiable actions that characterize the approach to negotiation among a nation's diplomatic corps.

To be classified as distinctive, it is essential that such patterns be compared to those of other countries. It must be determined whether such patterns represent a truly distinct way of negotiating for a country or just the way that negotiations are typically conducted by most countries' diplomats. Lang (1993), for example, describes a professional subculture of negotiation based on common professional socialization that involves common educational and career backgrounds, beliefs, norms and customs. He and others assert that there is a strong global culture of diplomatic practice that can easily override the cultural norms and mores of individual societies. Alger (1961), for example, identifies a common process of socialization among delegates at the United Nations, which binds them to a larger community of shared values and ideas that often can be very different from their individual national perspectives. Modelski's conclusions (1970) are similar after analyzing a sample of foreign ministers. Members of this negotiation subculture, while certainly conditioned by their national cultures, are likely to demonstrate a common approach to negotiating that is relatively invariant across countries. Thus, while patterned negotiating behavior may be observable and measurable for particular country diplomats, these trends may only demonstrate the influence of a universal

professional subculture (Zartman and Berman, 1982). Diplomats from different countries may practice fairly similar patterns of negotiation behavior. The only way of distilling out the residual differences and detecting the distinguishing characteristics is to compare and contrast country patterns analytically.

Ultimately, the description of any country's national negotiating behavior is a generalization. As with any generalization, it is always possible to generate specific cases where the pattern is contradicted. However, these general patterns identify the pervasive and persistent behaviors that denote negotiation behavior and thinking *most of the time*.

In summary, a pattern of national negotiating behavior can be defined as a complex, multifactor description of characteristic (that is, typical and pervasive) and recurrent (that is, persistent) behaviors and perspectives of national negotiators that is consistently demonstrated and can be observed empirically across a wide range of negotiation cases and situations. Such patterns are usually distinctive from transnational negotiating behaviors, though they need not be unique. Evident functioning of these patterns cannot be expected in all cases; as with the observation of any complex human behavior, there will always be exceptions from the general trend. Such empirically-based behavioral patterns uncover a regularity that facilitates projection of national positions, responses and perceptions. These trends can be useful in preparing and planning for a negotiation, as well as in the iterative or problem-solving search for solutions during a negotiation. Approaches to formulating or framing issues, viewing negotiation process, and targeting outcomes in a certain way are usually evidence for these general negotiation patterns.

OBJECTIVES

This study does not address the difficult definitional and measurement debates surrounding the concepts of *negotiating style* and *cultural effects* on negotiation (see Faure and Sjöstedt, 1993, on definitional issues). Rather, the study takes a behavioral and empirical path. It focuses on the observable negotiating behaviors exhibited by national delegations. Collection and analysis of national behaviors in a large number of negotiation cases can produce a reliable descriptive profile of basic national perspectives and responses to different negotiation situations. By comparing and contrasting the negotiating profiles of various countries, it should be possible, then, to assess differences or commonalities that would suggest either a universal negotiation culture or distinctive national patterns of behavior.

Specifically, the goals of this study are to describe patterns of negotiating behavior that appear to characterize Austrian international diplomacy and to evaluate how these patterns compare to negotiating behaviors observed in other countries. In so doing, we seek to develop and test an analytical method that can identify and characterize negotiating behaviors. To accomplish these goals, the study experiments with an empirical methodology and cross-checks its results with a more traditional descriptive approach. Such a methodology is transportable to other negotiation situations and provides an analytical approach to defining negotiating behavior that seeks to minimize bias and stereotype.

Ultimately, this research and methodological approach may provide international negotiators with a better understanding of both their own behavior and that of other nationals. Negotiators are often oblivious to their own behavior and how it is perceived

by others. Knowledge of one's own approach to negotiation can help in self-evaluation of effectiveness in achieving national interests and goals. As well, a more analytical understanding of other parties' negotiating behavior can help in planning more realistic and effective strategies and problem-solving approaches to future negotiations.

The report begins with a descriptive analysis of Austrian negotiating behavior based on *introspective interviews* with senior Austrian diplomats and negotiators. The findings are then compared with a more *systematic statistical analysis* of Austrian negotiating behavior as observed in 24 different international cases. In addition, these Austrian data are analyzed in contrast with a companion data base consisting of negotiation cases as experienced by other small and mid-sized countries. This systematic comparison of Austrian and non-Austrian cases seeks to identify points of commonality and difference that can further help in describing an Austrian negotiation profile. These two approaches -- the introspective and the observational -- are supportive of each other and facilitate the development of reliable generalizations about Austrian negotiation patterns. Finally, a concluding section assesses all of the results to evaluate if Austrian negotiating behavior is truly distinctive or similar to a universal negotiating approach, and what these conclusions might imply in terms of Austria's future role in an increasingly integrated Europe.

DESCRIPTION OF AUSTRIAN NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR

A descriptive profile of Austrian negotiating behavior was generated through an introspective data gathering process. A small number of senior Austrian diplomats and negotiators were

asked to reflect on their first-hand experiences in a wide range of negotiation situations to characterize their perceptions of the Austrian national approach to international negotiations. By analyzing the interview results, a new understanding of Austrian negotiating patterns emerges that accounts for a broad spectrum of issues and situations.

Approach

Eleven Austrian negotiators and diplomats were interviewed in June 1994 (see Appendix A for the interview guide). Six officials were from the Foreign Affairs Ministry, three were from the Federal Chancellory, one from the Finance Ministry and one from the Environment Ministry. All were senior officials with many years as practitioners of negotiation. In addition, as a means of assessing the reliability of the interview results, two non-Austrians diplomats who have had extensive experience negotiating with Austrians on a variety of issues were also interviewed.[2] Each interview lasted between one and two hours and probed nine dimensions of negotiating behavior. The format of the interviews was open-ended, except for guiding questions to orient the interviewee on each dimension. The nine categories include:

Objectives: How are negotiating objectives defined?

Framing: How are the problems, issues and the other side evaluated and framed?

Situational Perceptions: How do negotiators perceive the negotiation situation?

Planning: How do negotiators prepare and plan in the prenegotiation period?

Process and Strategy: How is the negotiation plan exercised in

[2] A condition of the interviews was to maintain the anonymity of the interviewed officials.

terms of bargaining strategies, tactics, relationships, and communication?

Support and Latitude: How does bureaucratic and informational support to the delegation influence its degree of latitude?

End-Game: How is the end-game conducted?

Fairness: How are negotiated solutions perceived?

Effectiveness: Do you believe that Austrian negotiating approaches have been successful?

The purpose of these interviews was to examine and characterize, if possible, the Austrian negotiating experience across a wide range of issue areas and in both bilateral and multilateral contexts. Interviewees were asked to discuss each dimension based upon their background in many negotiations, not just one or two particular cases. Thus, they were asked to generalize from their experience and provide a broad perspective on Austrian actions and responses in international negotiation situations, not unique reactions in particular cases.

All of the interviewees participated enthusiastically. They took the time to respond to the questions thoughtfully and seriously and to generalize beyond particular idiosyncratic cases. Overall, the discussions were rather open and freewheeling. All of the interviews lasted longer than the allotted time of one hour.

Many interesting conclusions can be drawn from this introspective approach. They are presented in the next section. However, the approach possesses certain drawbacks, most obvious of which is the sample size. Certainly, if we had interviewed more officials from a wider number of ministries and with a wider range of seniority, who have dealt with a broader range of negotiation issues and contexts, the results may have been more generalizable

and more (or less) consistent. At the same time, the current sample does draw upon a range of backgrounds of senior officials who have had multiple negotiation experiences. The interviewers sensed that many themes kept reappearing across the discussions, suggesting that some common underlying patterns were emerging despite the small sample. As well, the interviews with the two non-Austrian diplomats to seek some limited validation of the Austrian interviews -- to assess if their responses were reliable and not intentionally misleading -- provided similar insights as the Austrian sessions. Finally, the interviews, though small in number, are compared in the subsequent chapter with observational data collected on a larger set of Austrian negotiating cases. That data base seeks to identify what happened in particular negotiations in which Austrians participated.

The next section presents themes directly derived from the interviews on each of the nine dimensions. These themes suggest patterns that seem to characterize Austrian negotiating behavior.

Themes Across the Nine Negotiation Dimensions

The brief thematic assessments in each of the nine negotiation dimensions amount to generalizations about Austrian behavior and perceptions in international negotiation situations. Many of these assessments are logically consistent, but some are inconsistent, suggesting variation in Austrian approaches. Certainly, a monolithic and commonly accepted and executed Austrian approach to negotiations was not anticipated nor is realistic given complex national and international goals.

1. Objectives: How are negotiating objectives defined?

The process of defining negotiating objectives is a political process involving a variety of ministries, political parties, and other stakeholders. It is an ongoing interactive process that always seeks to involve all constituencies, including "social partners" (which involve labor, business, and agricultural organizations). The goal is to achieve consensus while getting everyone represented. The outcome is a mandate for the negotiation delegation. Mandates are usually broadly stated to provide significant latitude to the delegation. By design, mandates lack detail so as not to be overly constraining at the bargaining table.

Developing a mandate entails gaining consensus among the relevant ministries and others. The Foreign Ministry often acts as a generalist at the center of consensus building, networking with stakeholders and working with other ministries and experts. Generally, as more domestic stakeholders are involved and more perspectives must be accommodated in the consensus, the clarity of Austrian goals to be attained in the negotiations is likely to suffer.

In continuous post-agreement negotiations (like CSCE), there are generally known mandates. These are standing interagency agreements that tend to be flexible on the details, especially when the Foreign Ministry has the lead. As well, on certain issues, such as human rights and ethnic minorities, there are general and known national positions that provide a clear direction and mandate to negotiating teams.

When the issues are very clear, it is possible to develop more detailed mandates. When the issues are not critical or central to Austrian interests, then Austria's objectives may not be very well defined, and the negotiation delegation will have

greater flexibility and latitude. However, a delegation's latitude may be constrained if it appears that the negotiated outcome will have a negative consequence for Austria.

Objectives are often defined in legal terms, that is, as the domestic rules that will have to be changed as a consequence of a particular negotiated outcome. Frequently, Austrian objectives are defined in terms that match international standards or directions. They can also be strongly influenced by international coalitions. Sometimes, it is possible to force national change and go beyond international standards.

2. Framing: How are the problems, issues and the other side framed and evaluated?

Issues are framed openly and flexibly so as to attract a broad consensus. Framing is an open and informal process. Policy papers are framed and distributed to all ministries by a lead ministry and positions are modified if there are exceptions. The process of coordination across ministries by which issues are framed is *not* viewed as an internal bargaining process, but as a lobbying effort. It is not a controversial or adversarial process, but a cooperative and flexible one. When the stakes are high, important political lobbying goes on behind the scenes across ministries. Sensitive issues are usually raised to the level of high level party officials to decide.

Generally, Austrians seek a middle-of-the-road position, unless it is seen as politically advantageous (for example, to please the "green lobby") to frame an issue otherwise. Issues and possible solutions are framed in flexible way, because Austrians approach negotiation as a cooperative problem-solving process. They see it as often better to get some suboptimal solution, than to stick to predetermined points and get nothing. Issues and

goals are defined generally and flexibly to give negotiators more latitude to make offers and accept proposals. By framing issues in this way, false hopes and public expectations are also dampened. But Austrians may also be more open to influence from other parties as a result.

3. Situational Perceptions: How do negotiators perceive the negotiation situation?

Major perceived power differentials among negotiating parties can be neutralized by the skillful use of tactics. For example, small countries can get their proposals tabled via other countries, they can join coalitions, and they can try to split other coalitions. As well, power differentials can be reduced in negotiations by actively lobbying for your positions and fostering informal consultations with other delegations.

In multilateral fora, small countries, such as Austria, often feel inferior and as a result seek to join coalitions with other like-minded countries more frequently. The number of issues and decisions that must be made in complex multilateral negotiations can often overwhelm small delegations from small countries, again leading them to coalesce with others. At the same time, Austria might "go it alone" if the issue is salient back home and an independent, though unsuccessful, lone stance is seen as politically useful. In bilateral negotiations where Austria sees itself in a more powerful role, it often takes the lead in setting the agenda and offering demands and proposals. Bilateral is the preferred forum for Austrian negotiators.

The media can be manipulated tactically to support the diplomatic effort. It is important to manage the media and what they are told carefully to avoid setting false hopes and high

expectations in the public. Thought needs to be given to how the media is managed so as not to expose extreme positions that could yield unreasonable public expectations. At the same time, the media can be used to put pressures on other delegations. A high profile negotiation that is covered by the media tends to make delegations less flexible; it is difficult to modify positions in public. On the other hand, if the media can produce public support for the negotiation, it will increase the delegation's flexibility and latitude. If the issues are popular and can catch the public imagination, as in the case of some environmental issues for example, media can be used to help a negotiating delegation by increasing its flexibility. The media sometimes can play the role of an external "enemy," unifying the delegation and its position against a common "foe." In these cases, the media can be used tactically as a scapegoat or to generate a tougher position.

The physical location of the negotiation is very important; away from home, the delegation can focus its attention solely on the negotiation. When negotiations are conducted away from home, the process tends to get more informal and relaxed which usually produces increased mutual understanding. However, if the negotiation is held at home, the delegation has access to more information and support. It is useful to hold talks in private and comfortable settings; this puts the negotiations on a more personal level and helps to reduce suspicion. But, in general, location is seen as having minimal impact on the process. Austrians view deadlines as positive mechanisms that force decisions, tradeoffs and compromises. Deadlines work because they effectively push the decision to political levels, which is where impasses can be overcome.

4. Planning: How do negotiators prepare and plan in the prenegotiation period?

Planning is a staged process: the issues and positions are studied, reassessment occurs when problems arise, and strategizing ensues throughout the process. Approaches to planning, though, are highly dependent on the Chief of Delegation's style. There is a study period before you enter negotiations, mixed with a little strategizing. As the negotiation proceeds and you learn the positions and strategies of the other major parties, Austrian delegations conduct more conscious strategizing. Strategizing requires adjustment over time in reaction to the reality in the negotiations. Thus, planning is primarily a process of study and analysis. Typically, strategizing is not undertaken initially, but in reaction to the moves of others. Strategizing is an intuitive and improvised effort for Austrians.

The negotiation mandate is often formulated broadly to provide latitude to the delegation. Within the mandate, the delegation must plan and define what it wants from the talks, what is realistic to achieve, how to explain the Austrian position, and how to react to anticipated responses. This planning usually involves close coordination between civil servants and the political levels and occurs within a broad process of consultation within the lead ministry, with other interested parts of government, and with the established social partners.

In multilateral negotiations, where Austria is not a strong player, much planning occurs on an informal basis with friendly delegations as the negotiation unfolds. Austrians closely watch other players to find where they fit in, and who are their natural allies and coalition partners. Tactical approaches are often developed informally within these coalitions. In bilateral negotiations, on the other hand, most planning needs to be conducted *before* the talks begin to identify issues to emphasize

and compromises to seek.

5. Process and Strategy: How is the negotiation plan exercised in terms of bargaining strategies, tactics, relationships, and communication?

Two very different and somewhat conflicting images of Austrian conduct in negotiating settings emerged from the interviews with Foreign Affairs Ministry officials, on one hand, and Federal Chancellory and other ministry officials, on the other. The approach described by Foreign Affairs interviewees is highly competitive, interest-based, and tactical; it appears to be prevalent when Austria is dealing with high stake-high interest issues. The approach portrayed by the other interviewees is consensual and problem-solving in orientation, and tends to prevail when the issues are less salient to Austria or when Austrian interests are best served by being flexible and finding compromises rather than hanging tough and risking a "no-agreement" outcome.

a. *Competitive Approach*. The Austrian approach to negotiation is very tactical and interest-based. The negotiation process is very much conceived of as a competitive bargaining situation. In large multilateral negotiations, Austria often uses persuasive arguments to get other parties to accept its demands. However, as a small country, the strategic orchestration of such approaches is often difficult to execute. Several illustrative tactical approaches used in multilateral negotiations were described:

Austrian delegations have cut off talks with the other side if they reached a snag in negotiations in order to confer with their home office. This demonstrated to the other side that the problem was nontrivial to the Austrians.

When faced with a larger or more powerful delegation, an Austrian delegation sought one individual point of contact in that

other delegation to personalize and equalize the interaction.

Escalation of a dispute with another delegation was avoided consciously, because it would be difficult later to reconcile and save face.

Austrian delegations often seek to gain influence over the process by presenting the first paper or proposal and thus frame the ensuing discussion.

Austrian delegations seek to develop personal relationships with the members of other delegations. This provides important informal channels of communication that can be used to convince and persuade others of Austrian views.

Strategically in complex negotiations, Austrians seek to create small successes early for confidence building purposes. The difficult issues can be pushed off to the end of the negotiations when there may be deadlines and more pressure to find compromises.

As a smaller country, Austria has found that it is important to get its concerns involved early in the deliberations before the big power tradeoffs and package-building.

On issues of critical national interest to Austria, there is no hesitation to take a controversial stance in the negotiation process, even if it means going head-to-head with more powerful countries or coalitions. If the issue is sufficiently important, Austria has been willing to warn other parties that it might block agreement. Flexibility is reduced when issues perceived to be of high national interest are at stake.

b. *Consensual Approach*. The Austrian negotiator is a highly consensual type, employing problem-solving instead of competitive actions, using promises instead of threats, and using informal contacts and communication channels. Austrians use a problem-solving negotiation approach to find common ground; a "tit-for-tat" exchange of tradeoffs is not a favored Austrian approach. Rarely do Austrian negotiators use threats or warnings as in "bazaar" bargaining; these are inelegant tactics and are usually ineffective for small countries such as Austria. In bilateral negotiations, even where Austria could be considered the more

powerful party, it has not been inclined to pursue open disagreements with the other side.

Up until the end of the Cold War, Austria traditionally played the role of mediator between East and West, actively seeking consensus on compromise solutions. As this function is no longer needed, Austria's approach has now shifted more explicitly toward seeking its own national interests, being more tactical, and looking for allies in the negotiation context.

6. Support and Latitude: How does bureaucratic and informational support to the delegation influence its latitude?

When Austrian delegations are large enough, the responsibility for component issues is often decentralized. Each issue subgroup reports back to the Chief of Delegation on problems and these are then analyzed and studied. It is important for the delegation to maintain the latitude it was given in its initial mandate. This way, the delegation controls the flexibility it needs to make compromises. But there are forces that can reduce the delegation's latitude. First, there is frequent coordination and sharing of information across ministries on highly salient negotiations. Salience depends largely on the extent of media coverage and the importance of the issue at political levels. Coordinative meetings often produce instructions to delegations that restrict their latitude for maneuvering at the bargaining table.

Second, the attention of high level policy makers to a negotiation can make the delegation stronger. Typically, it will cause delegations to work harder to please the political levels by achieving their mandate. It also confirms stated public positions to other parties, but, in so doing, reduces flexibility. Low

levels of attention, on the other hand, can provide a delegation with greater latitude and flexibility in the negotiations.

In general, the Chiefs of Austrian delegations have wide latitude to act and react in the negotiation setting. It is believed that Austrian delegations often have wider latitude and less specific instructions than other country delegations. However, when major changes in the situation are encountered that may require a change to instructions, delegations are obliged to consult with top officials back home.

7. End-Game: How is the end-game conducted?

As a small country, Austria usually is not in a position to block a large multinational negotiation. As a result, the end-game and its deadline pressure to compromise often involves extensive lobbying to make linkages and tradeoffs that achieve at least some of Austria's objectives. Thus, Austria often appears to be more flexible in the end. Negotiators must retain some resources valued by the other side that they are willing to give away in an end-game tradeoff.

When negotiations are threatened with impasse or when deadlines are close at hand, the highest political levels are often brought in at the end-game phase to seek a resolution to the problem. They usually possess the maneuvering capability that the delegation lacks. Apolitical senior advisors who do not have any stake in the outcome are also often useful to bring in to make recommendations in the end-game.

In large multilateral negotiations, Austrian negotiators usually prefer a modest agreement to no agreement at all; often, they have no other choice because of prevailing power relations.

They hope that unsatisfactory results can be improved at a later round. In bilateral talks, on the other hand, Austria is often willing to walk away from the table if the only proposed solution does not meet its national needs. In many situations, the Austrian position may not be as much to seek a "win-win" outcome as a "no lose" solution.

8. Fairness: How are negotiated solutions perceived?

Fairness is *not* a criteria in assessing negotiated solutions; fairness is a relative term and means something different to each country. Solutions are sought in negotiations that account for the vital interests of the country. There is usually an attempt to develop solutions that balance the vital interests of all parties. This balancing act always involves compromises, so, to varying degrees, there are always winners and losers. When decisions are made by consensus in multilateral negotiations, assessing fairness and the balancing of agreements are essential. The result may not be "fair" in the abstract, but what is sought is a careful balancing of divergent national interests. Austria, as other countries, seeks to maximize its national objectives, though it is also under the sometimes countervailing pressure to succeed in reaching an agreement.

Equity should by the hallmark of negotiated outcomes. For example, it is often the case that the big powers can and should carry an over-proportional burden in implementing a solution. Equality principles, on the other hand, are artificial concepts and may not, in fact, produce fair solutions. Compensation is sometimes used as the basis for an agreement to enable tradeoffs across sectors, thus facilitating equitable solutions. Equity is the basis for finding acceptable negotiated agreements. This means that all parties' interests and needs must be taken into

account. Equitable solutions that take care not only of others' needs, but of Austria's as well are required in order to be able to "sell" the results to the public.

The first order of business in a negotiation is to seek a solution that is closest to the mandate given to the Austrian delegation. The delegation should stand fast for what it wants initially. To reach a realistic agreement, however, a compromise may be required. An important challenge is to resolve this mixed motive dilemma. If the delegation assesses this to be the case, it should seek an equitable outcome that Austrians will be able to accept. When a negotiation is concerned with issues that are central to Austria's national interests, Austria tries to maximize its benefits in the outcome. When the issues are not felt to be salient to Austria, policy makers can think about fair solutions.

9. Effectiveness: Do you believe that Austrian negotiating approaches have been successful?

Austria's "soft approach" to negotiations does not neglect its essential interests. Its accommodating stance is viewed positively by other countries who, as a result, may be more forthcoming and willing to accept Austrian views on at least secondary issues. Because of the consensus rule in most multilateral fora, Austria usually achieves its objectives. Under these rules, Austria cannot be forced to accept something it does not want, because it can veto the outcome.

In general, Austria's national goals have been achieved in multilateral negotiations. The texts are usually close to Austria's initial positions. If Austria's objectives were too optimistic initially, on the other hand, they were often not accomplished. While Austrian delegations are often able to

achieve the goals in their mandate, the implementing details that are negotiated are often significantly different than what was anticipated.

Analysis

Several common themes emerge from these interview responses that suggest a characteristic or typical Austrian negotiating approach.[3] They include:

Seeking consensus and coordination at home with all stakeholders, including social partners, to set objectives, frame the problem, and plan for negotiation.

Operating with a broad mandate that offers considerable latitude in formulating day-to-day strategies.

Employing a "gentle" and cooperative negotiation approach, while remaining tough on substance.

Striving to avoid conflict with other parties.

Being pragmatic rather than principled and avoiding fixed positions, except on strong interests.

Maintaining a tactical and competitive orientation when the issues are strongly salient and the stakes are high, but a problem-solving and consensus-seeking perspective in less salient situations or when Austrian interests are best served by being flexible and finding compromise solutions.

Reacting quickly to events and eagerly forging coalitions to enhance its interests in multilateral negotiations.

Being well prepared, careful and systematic planners, although enjoying the self-image of improvising.

Assuming the role of mediator and, thus, facilitating the search for compromises among larger powers.

---

[3] As will be seen in the next section, these impressionistic conclusions are corroborated by a systematic comparative analysis of cases.

Preferring deadlines that induce flexibility, because agreement is important for its own sake, and getting high level political actors involved directly in the negotiation process.

Recognizing fairness as an equitable balancing of national self-interests.

Over time, negotiating behavior patterns can change and with Austria's accession to the European Union and the end of the Cold War, it is highly likely that some of these themes may evolve. The interviewees for this study suggested that political developments are more likely to stimulate such behavioral changes than cultural factors (see Whelen, 1979).

SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATIONAL ASSESSMENT

Because of shortcomings of the introspective approach described in the previous section, such as memory bias, another more systematic assessment was conducted. A unique data base of international negotiation cases and corresponding Austrian negotiating behaviors was developed and facilitated a systematic analysis to identify characteristic patterns. In 1993, twenty-four extended interviews were conducted with Austrian diplomats to detail their experiences in one of 24 different international negotiations in which they participated personally (see Spector, 1993a and Druckman, 1993). The interviews were organized to elicit information about nine major elements of a negotiation: the structure of the talks, the composition of the delegation, bureaucratic support, the issues, the immediate situation facing

the negotiators, analytical support, the process, the outcomes, and concurrent events taking place away from the negotiations.[4] Approximately 90 questions were asked about each case.

These questions were of two kinds: those that describe the negotiation situation in general and those that characterize specific Austrian responses, behaviors, and perceptions of the negotiation as a participant. In this analysis, the focus is on the latter questions which identify Austrian negotiation actions and perspectives (see Table 1). Operationally, negotiation conduct is revealed by observable patterns in these types of behavioral and perceptual factors.

There are several ways one can measure patterned negotiating behavior. All require the development of generalizations to characterize pervasive and persistent approaches to negotiation. The first -- *a participant approach* -- is to ask a wide range of negotiators directly how they perceived and behaved in particular negotiation environments. This is the approach taken in the Austrian interviews discussed below. These observations can be analyzed across respondents to identify general trends. But relying on self-reports, this approach runs the risk of memory distortion and dependence on potentially self-serving data that may place national behavior into the best light. The second -- *an expert observer approach* -- is to ask a panel of experts, those who have observed many national negotiators in operation across many negotiation cases, to provide their insights and impressions of any persistent patterns that characterize the behavior and thinking of these diplomats. Common insights that emerge across the expert panel can be viewed as uncovering important trends about national negotiating behavior. (This is the basis for the

[4] Appendix B presents the entire interview guide.

previously described introspective analysis.)

A third approach to identifying a patterned negotiating behavior is to elicit the impressions of a wide range of negotiators from other countries who regularly observe and interact with the first's diplomats. This approach -- *a cohort approach* -- avoids the potential bias of directly asking nationals about their own behavior. Patterned negotiating behavior is a matter of how thinking and behavior are manifested in public, how they are perceived in the eyes of others. A fourth approach -- *a role playing approach* -- uses practicing negotiators to respond, not to their own behavior or thinking in a particular case which could elicit self-serving answers, but to hypothetical negotiating scenarios. This mechanism distances the respondent from describing behavior in an actual case in which real stakes might prejudice the

Table 1. Information about Austrian Negotiation Behavior Elicited in the Interviews

The Delegation Structure
Typical delegation size
Extent of delegates' technical knowledge
Extent of delegate prior negotiation experience
Extent of personnel turnover in delegation over time
Extent of multi-agency participation
Perceived power differential with other delegations
Objectives and Issues
Clarity of delegation's objectives
Relative agreement/dissensus among national agencies on objectives
Preparation and Support
Length of time allocated to preparation
Degree of high level attention to the negotiations
Extent of analytical support provided to the delegation
Provision of special support infrastructure
Extent of problems encountered in analysis and planning
The Process
Amount of control exercised by chief of delegation
Use of problem-solving versus competitive approach
Extent of latitude allowed to delegation
Extent of informal consultations
Extent of friendliness with other delegations
Degree to which persuasive tactics are employed

responses. A fifth approach -- *secondary source or content analysis of cases* -- analyzes a large number of negotiation cases in which the behavior and thinking of national delegations was well documented. But the availability of transcripts, memoirs and other sources that contain sufficient detail to make the necessary assessments may be extremely limited. Moreover, memoirs, especially with the benefit of hindsight, are highly prone to containing biased descriptions of negotiator behavior and thought.

Primarily, the systematic observational analysis uses the first approach, the participant approach, to develop a data base of Austrian negotiating behavior (19 variables across 24 cases -- see Table 1). A comparative non-Austrian data base was developed using a combination of the expert observer and secondary source approaches. Data on the same 19 variables across ten cases were obtained by expert observers, and five additional cases (but on fewer variables) were developed using the secondary source approach.[5] To ensure comparability with the Austrian cases, the non-Austrian sample was limited to only small and mid-sized countries. In addition to containing behavioral and perceptual factors that reflect on negotiator performance, both data bases also include factors that help to define the negotiation setting, such as structural, situational, and outcome variables. These are

[5] The Austrian and non-Austrian cases are listed in Appendix C. Data for the non-Austrian expert observer cases were developed by Daniel Druckman and graduate student interns in the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Project at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) who had conducted in depth studies of and/or observed particular international negotiations, and by senior scholars who participated in a study group on power asymmetry in negotiation sponsored by the PIN Project. The secondary source approach, also sponsored by the PIN Project, yielded yet additional cases, but on a smaller set of variables, and is described in Larsson (1991). The coders of these non-Austrian cases responded to the same questions as the Austrian diplomats in their interviews. Their answers were coded into the same categories.

used in the analysis as grouping factors to evaluate if trends in negotiation behavior transcend particular cases or types of cases.

Since these data bases contain only a small sample of negotiation cases, they will yield meaningful results only in so far as they are seen as being fairly representative of the larger population of negotiation cases, and in the case of the Austrian sample, if the interviewees are viewed as representative as well. A basic criterion for representativeness is that no important characteristic is left out of the sample or consciously under- or over-represented, thereby introducing potential bias into the analysis. Table 2 describes the two data bases.

Table 2. Austrian and Non-Austrian Sample Comparisons

		Austrian (n=24)	Non-Austrian (n=15)
Negotiation Type:	Economic	25%	27%
	Environmental	29%	40%
	Security	17%	20%
	Political	29%	13%
Negotiation Size:	Bilateral	29%	60%
	Small multilateral	21%	13%
	Large multilateral	50%	27%
Respondent Level:	Junior	21%	-
	Mid-level	29%	-
	Senior	50%	-

Although these samples are small, the distributions are not extreme and do not appear to exclude important elements of the populations. The distributions are more symmetrical with regard to negotiation type and less with regard to negotiation size and respondent level.

The analysis of these data seeks a very simple result: to discover whether there are prevalent behavioral trends on each of

the nineteen factors listed in Table 1. In other words, if a patterned negotiating behavior indeed exists, it is anticipated that Austrian delegations will behave along very similar lines despite differences in negotiation issues and situation. Moreover, such recurring behavioral patterns, if they are evident for Austrian delegations, need to be significantly different from trends found in the non-Austrian data base analysis. In that case, the Austrian negotiating patterns could be viewed as more than just a reflection of an international professional subculture of diplomats; they would define the characteristic approach to international negotiations by Austrians.

The analytical approach proceeded through several steps. First, general behavioral patterns were sought by analyzing the Austrian and non-Austrian data bases independently. Basic descriptive profiles of Austrian and non-Austrian negotiating behaviors result, where behaviors that persist in more than 50 percent of the cases are viewed as recurring patterns. In order to reinforce these descriptive profiles of pervasive behavior, t-tests were performed to determine if there is a significant difference in means on the behavioral variables when grouped in terms of situational factors, such as size of the negotiation (that is, bilateral or multilateral), deadlines (firm or nonexistent), issue type (economic or environmental vs. political and security), number of issues (few or many), length of the negotiation (days or months vs. years), and openness of the talks (open or concealed). If these statistical tests revealed significant differences, it suggested a strong situational effect -- that the behavioral negotiation factors were strongly influenced by changes in the situation and that the behavioral patterns were not enduring. No significant differences, on the other hand, would indicate a general persistence of behavior, that behavioral trends transcend differences in cases and situation.

Another way of describing persistent behavioral patterns empirically was to cluster the behavioral data statistically. A multi-dimensional scaling technique was used to cluster the data into two dimensions. Variables that cluster together suggest correlated and characteristic approaches to negotiating.

Second, comparisons between these Austrian and non-Austrian patterns were made to indicate whether Austrian patterns can be deemed a particularly national approach. The t-tests were performed as well to evaluate if there were statistically significant differences in the means of the nineteen negotiating behavior factors between the two samples. Finally, the implications of these statistical findings were discussed and insights drawn for analysis, practice, and professional training -- for Austrians and non-Austrians alike.

RESULTS OF THE DATA ANALYSIS

General Austrian Negotiation Profile

Table 3 presents descriptive findings from the analysis of the Austrian data.

Delegation Structure. Austria's delegations tend to be compact, because of budgetary and human resource constraints. The delegations to international negotiation fora are typically small

Table 3. General Profile of Austrian and Non-Austrian Negotiating Behavior

	Austrian Sample (n=24)	Non-Austrian Sample (n=15)	t-Test Results between Samples
DELEGATION STRUCTURE			
Delegation size			
1 to 3	46%	20%	p<.037
4 to 9	46%	30%	
> 10	8%	50%	
	Mean=1.63	Mean=2.3	
Technical knowledge possessed by delegation			
By whole delegation	29%	40%	N.S.
By most of delegation	33%	20%	
By half or less of delegation	38%	40%	
Prior negotiation experience	50%	10%	p<.0001
A lot	42%	10%	
Somewhat	8%	80%	
A little	Mean=1.58	Mean=2.7	
Delegate turnover	54%	40%	N.S.
No changes	29%	47%	
Some changes	17%	13%	
Many changes			
Multi-agency participation	54%	0%	p<.041
None	17%	80%	
Few	29%	20%	
Many	Mean=1.75	Mean=2.2	
Perceived power differential	78%	-	N.S.
Asymmetrical	22%	-	
Symmetrical			
OBJECTIVES AND ISSUES			
Clarity of objectives			
Clear	79%	60%	N.S.
Unclear/vague	21%	40%	
Agreement among national agencies	75%	17%	p<.0001
Much agreement	25%	83%	
Some or no agreement	Mean=1.25	Mean=1.83	

PREPARATION AND SUPPORT			
Preparation Time			
Years	29%	0%	N.S.
Months or weeks	50%	75%	
Days or none	21%	25%	
High level attention			
Regular attention	79%	80%	N.S.
Irregular attention	21%	20%	
Analytical support			
provided	63%	57%	N.S.
Yes	37%	43%	
No			
Support infrastructure	54%	60%	
provided	17%	0%	N.S.
None	29%	40%	
Some			
A lot			
	63%	-	
Planning/analysis problems	37%	-	-
None			
A lot			
THE PROCESS			
Leadership style			
Strong control	29%	90%	p<.0001
Moderate control	13%	10%	
No control/delegation	58%	0%	
of tasks	Mean=2.29	Mean=1.1	
Planning style			
Study/Problem-solving	75%	31%	p<.011
Strategize/Compete	25%	69%	
	Mean=1.25	Mean=1.69	
Latitude of delegation			
No latitude	21%	13%	N.S.
Some latitude	42%	53%	
Much latitude	37%	33%	
Informal consultations			
Many	62%	50%	N.S.
Some	17%	30%	
Few	21%	20%	
Friendliness with others			
Very friendly	17%	0%	p<.029
Friendly	54%	40%	

Neutral	12%	20%	
Fluctuating/hostile	17%	40%	
	Mean=2.29	Mean=3.0	
Persuasive tactics used			
Frequently	17%	70%	p<.004
Occasionally	37%	20%	
Infrequently	46%	10%	
	Mean=2.29	Mean=1.4	

Note: N.S.: not statistically significant

(from 1-3 persons) or medium in size (from 4-9 persons). Rarely is a delegation of 10 or more diplomats dispatched to a negotiation session. The diplomatic experience of the typical delegation is usually extensive, with most delegates having participated in other international negotiations on the same or other issues previously. However, the extent to which delegation members possess specialized technical knowledge of the negotiation issues varies widely. Austrian diplomats tend more to be generalists than specialists. In general, Austrian delegations experience no changes in personnel over the course of an extended negotiation. Historically, the majority of delegations have been composed of Foreign Ministry personnel only; multi-agency participation in delegations is not usual. However, multi-agency participation rapidly is becoming more customary in Austrian delegations to recent negotiations and conferences. Also, there is very little turnover in these delegations. Finally, Austrian delegations usually do not view themselves as equal in power with other delegations; they perceive of themselves as being either stronger or weaker than their counterparts. Thus, from a power perspective, negotiations are often viewed as asymmetrical.

Objectives and Issues. In general, Austrian delegations are well briefed on the issues and their goals in negotiations. The negotiation objectives of Austrian delegations are clearly defined. While delegation size is usually small, it focuses on the principal issues of national concern. For multi-issue negotiations, unified national positions are usually hammered out prior to formal negotiations by committees comprised of the relevant national departments and agencies. In most cases, high levels of agreement and consensus are achieved in these prenegotiation consultations resulting in single, common positions to be brought forward by the Austrian delegation at the negotiating table.

Preparation and Support. Overall, Austrian delegations appear to take negotiation preparation and support seriously, allocating it adequate time, high level attention, and information resources. Preparation for upcoming international negotiations tends to be undertaken for weeks or months, but infrequently for longer than that. The large majority of international negotiations are monitored regularly by high-level Austrian officials, but very limited administrative or bureaucratic infrastructure is provided to support Austrian negotiating teams. These teams receive or can collect what they perceive to be adequate levels of information to prepare and plan for the negotiations and do not perceive that there are any major problems in planning or analysis.

The Process. The Austrian approach to the negotiation process itself assumes a decentralized problem-solving response and search for acceptable formulas, rather than a highly controlled competitive, win-lose strategy. Austrian delegations tend to engage in many informal consultations with other delegations and tend to develop rather friendly relations with them. They infrequently use threatening or persuasive tactics to further their interests in negotiation. Instead, the Austrian approach to the majority of international negotiations is a cooperative, problem-solving approach based on study and analysis of the issues; they generally seek win-win solutions. The typical style of Austrian leadership over the negotiation delegation is highly decentralized and this tends to facilitate the problem-solving approach. The chiefs of Austrian delegations usually assign extensive responsibility to delegation members. In part, perhaps this is a function of the small size of many delegations and the need for every member to perform important tasks. It is also a function of the high level of consensus that was achieved

back home in developing the mandate for the negotiations. Delegation members are usually given particular assignments to monitor the talks, present positions, handle certain issues or participate in working groups. Such delegation of responsibility opens the search for solutions in the negotiation process and could be effective in finding creative options to the issues under negotiation. In line with this open search, Austrian negotiators are allowed some or much latitude by the home office to strike a deal. Constraining instructions are not typical.

Table 4 presents a summary of this Austrian negotiating profile, including only those results that characterize half or more of the negotiation cases in the Austrian sample.

Situational Effects on this Profile

This profile of Austrian negotiating behavior is sensitive to changes in the negotiation situation in a few cases. This was the finding of a series

Table 4. Summary of Trends in Austrian Negotiating Behaviors (where behaviors are exhibited in 50% or more of negotiation cases in the sample)

Delegation Structure:
Extensive prior negotiation experience on the delegation
Minimal delegate turnover
No multi-agency participation on the delegation
Perceived asymmetric power positions in the negotiation across delegations

Objectives and Issues:
Clear objectives
Consensus among national agencies on objectives and interests

Preparation and Support:
Weeks or months in preparation and planning for negotiations
Regular high-level tracking of the negotiations
Adequate information and analytical resources provided to the delegation
No special support infrastructure provided
No problems encountered in planning

The Process:
Planning takes the form of studying the issues and problem-solving, rather than
strategizing
Delegation of tasks by the chief
Many informal consultations between the Austrian and other delegations
Friendly relations between the Austrian and other delegations

of t-tests performed on the nineteen behavioral factors. Tests were conducted across eight situational variables used to group the cases: the size and length of the negotiation, its openness, the existence of a deadline factor, the number and type of issues, leadership style in the delegation, and level of negotiation experience. These factors were suggested by a group of senior Austrian negotiators and scholars as likely to have a significant effect on typical patterns of Austrian negotiating behavior. Out of a total of 152 t-tests performed, *only 11* indicated statistically significant situational influences on Austrian behavioral patterns (see Table 5):

The Effect of Negotiation Type. When the sample is grouped by negotiation type, that is, by bilateral and multilateral cases, two significant differences are uncovered. Austrian delegations to *bilateral negotiations* tend to be granted only limited latitude in finding compromise solutions with other delegations and they experience very little personnel turnover. In *multilateral talks*, on the other hand, Austrian delegations appear to have much more flexibility in striking deals and experience more personnel turnover.

The Effect of the Number of Issues. When faced with a *small number of issues* in a negotiation, Austrians tend not to use persuasive tactics. However, in complex, *multi-issue negotiations*, Austrian delegations use persuasive tactics more frequently.

The Effect of Negotiation Length. Austrian delegations to *negotiations that extend over a long period* of time tend to be supported with more information and analytical resources than delegations to *shorter talks*.

The Effect of Open Processes. When the *negotiation process is open*, Austrian delegations tend to have little turnover, but when the *process is concealing*, turnover increases.

The Effect of Issue Type. *"High politics" issues*, those dealing with political and security matters, tend to generate much agreement and consensus on objectives among Austrian domestic agencies and stakeholders, while *"low politics" issues*, for example, those dealing with

Table 5. Situational Correlates of Austrian Negotiating Behavior: t-Test Results (N=24)

Grouping VariableDependent VariableSignificance and Mean Values
Grouped by Negotiation TypeLatitude Bilateral1.8 (Some)p<.03 Multilateral2.5 (Much) *Turnover* Bilateral1.2 (None)p<.002 Multilateral2.1 (Some)
Grouped by Number of IssuesPersuasive Tactics Few issues2.7 (Infrequent use)p<.03 Many issues2.1 (Occasional use)
Grouped by Negotiation LengthAnalytical Support Short talks1.9 (Some)p<.06 Long talks2.6 (A lot)
Grouped by Openness of ProcessTurnover Open1.3 (None)p<.03 Concealed2.0 (Some)
Grouped by Issue TypeConsensus At Home Low Politics1.4 (Some)p<.09 High Politics1.1 (A lot)
Grouped by Negotiation ExperiencePower A lot1.7 (Stronger)p<.06 Some or none2.3 (Weaker) *Preparation Time* A lot2.2 (Shorter)p<.09 Some or none1.7 (Longer)
Grouped by Leadership StylePreparation Time Strong control1.6 (Longer)p<.07 Decentralized2.1 (Shorter) *Planning Problems* Strong control1.6 (A lot)p<.07 Decentralized1.2 (None) *Study or Strategize* Strong control1.5 (Strategizing)p<.04 Decentralized1.1 (Studying)

economics and environmental matters, generate somewhat less agreement at home.

The Effect of Prior Negotiation Experience. When Austrian delegations are *highly experienced*, they tend to feel more powerful than other delegations; when Austrians are *less experienced*, they tend to feel weaker. *Highly experienced* delegations tend to spend less time preparing for talks than *less experienced* delegations.

The Effects of Leadership Style. Austrian delegations that are managed by Chiefs-of-Delegation who exercise *strong and centralized leadership* engage in more prenegotiation preparation, tend to focus on strategizing the negotiation, and believe that they have more problems in planning. On the other hand, *decentralized negotiation missions* from Austria, while they spend less time on preparation, conduct more studies and analyses of issues and positions, and feel they have fewer problems in planning.

Other than these interesting exceptions, the profile presented in Table 4 represents recurring Austrian negotiating behavior that appears to be relatively indifferent to particular negotiation situations.

Clustering of Austrian Behaviors

Another way of characterizing recurring Austrian negotiating behavior is to determine if the factors that describe Austrian behavior correlate and cluster together in any meaningful ways that suggest the dimensions of a typical approach to negotiations. The nineteen behavioral variables were correlated with each other and these correlations were used as indicators of similarity in a

multidimensional scaling algorithm.[6]

Figure 1 presents the results. The two dimensions together account for 54 percent of the variation in the variables. Three clusters of variables are apparent. By looking at the factors in each cluster, it is possible to give each cluster characteristic labels. Cluster A is a *"delegation structure and support"* cluster. This cluster suggests that Austrian ways of composing delegations and supporting them with resources are closely correlated. Cluster B is a *"planning and preparation"* cluster. Here, variables that deal with typical Austrian ways of preparing for a negotiation tend to cluster together. Cluster C can loosely be called a *"process"* cluster. The variables that correlate together in this cluster represent characteristic Austrian approaches to conducting the negotiation process.

The two dimensions in Figure 1 can also be labeled based upon the variables that fall at the extremities of each dimension. Dimension 1 (horizontal) appears to capture an *"activities"* dimension, with intra-delegation organizing and planning activities at the left and inter-delegation negotiating activities to the right. Dimension 2 (vertical) seems to capture the *"functional"* aspects of negotiation. Leadership, control, and power factors are concentrated at the top, and planning and approach factors are concentrated at the bottom. The fact that the variables correlate with each other, cluster as they do, and suggest meaningful labeling in terms of their dimensional arrays

[6] The gamma correlation coefficient was the non-parametric measure of association used. It makes few assumptions about scaling of variables or frequency distributions. The statistic analyzes the pattern of responses in contingency tables and is thus well suited to the type of data collected for this study. (See Goodman and Kruskal, 1954, for a discussion of this statistic.)

indicates that there is some coherence to Austrian negotiating behavior. It is not random activity; factors that relate to common activities tend to cluster together.

Negotiated Outcomes

Just a few Austrian behaviors correlate with outcome variables in the data base.[7] The possession of clear objectives (r=.71) and perceptions of power symmetry (r=.67) covary with success in developing legally binding agreements. Having explicit goals and a sense of fair and level playing fields seems to encourage parties to commit themselves to such accords. At the same time, other behavioral factors correlate strongly with the achievement of only partial agreements. Domestic consensus (r=1.0) and high level attention (r=1.0) covary with partial

[7] Gamma correlations were calculated (see previous footnote).

Figure 1. Multi-Dimensional Scaling of Austrian Negotiating Behaviors

outcomes. We can speculate that when the issues are highly sensitive or controversial and when high stakes are involved, Austrians would prefer establishing a partial solution and continuing negotiations on the remaining points rather than accept outright deadlock and possible failure.

Comparison with Non-Austrian Sample

Do these Austrian behavioral trends constitute an exclusively Austrian approach? It is necessary to compare these trends with non-Austrian trends to assess whether they coincide with an international subculture of negotiation. Table 3 displayed the descriptive Austrian profile in contrast with similar descriptive results from the non-Austrian sample.[8] There are eight statistically significant differences between the Austrian and non-Austrian samples.[9] The following differences were indicated by the results:

- Non-Austrians generally send large delegations, while Austrians do not ($p<.037$)
- Austrian delegations usually have much prior negotiation experience, while non-Austrians have minimal experience ($p<.0001$)

[8] As indicated earlier, the non-Austrian sample includes only cases involving small- or medium-sized countries. Cases that highlight the negotiating behavior of big powers and large nations were excluded because they may not be comparable to Austria. It was hypothesized that countries with more resources and more complex interests may exhibit very different behavioral patterns in the negotiation context (country size and power hypothesis).

[9] It is interesting to note that a larger data base of non-Austrian cases (n=36), including the same 15 small- to medium-sized country cases *plus* 21 more cases involving big powers, was also compared to the same Austrian sample. While the percentages varied, the *same significant differences* between Austrian and non-Austrian cases emerged as in the reported analysis. Thus, the hypothesis that country size effects negotiating behavior patterns is not substantiated in this test.

oThere is generally minimal multi-agency participation on Austrian delegations, while moderate multi-agency participation is common in non-Austrian delegations ($p<.041$)

oAustrians can achieve high interagency consensus about national interests and objectives during the prenegotiation period, while non-Austrians generally obtain only low consensus ($p<.0001$)

oAustrian chiefs-of-delegation typically delegate responsibility and exercise minimal control, while non-Austrian chiefs-of-delegation exercise much stronger and centralized leadership control ($p<.0001$)

oAustrians typically exercise a problem-solving, win-win style of negotiation, while non-Austrians employ a competitive, win-lose style ($p<.011$)

oNon-Austrians frequently use threats and promises as tactical moves in the negotiation, while Austrians do not ($p<.004$)

oAustrian delegations consciously strive to develop very friendly relations with other delegations, while non-Austrians sometimes seek friendly and sometimes hostile relations ($p<.029$).

On another nine attributes, there are basic similarities between prominent Austrian and non-Austrian behavioral trends: moderate levels of technical knowledge on the delegation, minimal-to-moderate levels delegate turnover, substantial clarity of goals, moderate preparation time, regular high level attention to the negotiations, substantial information and analytical support to the delegation, minimal additional bureaucratic support to the delegation from the home office, moderate latitude, and many informal consultations.[10]

[10] No data were available for the non-Austrian sample on the remaining two variables -- power differential and planning problems.

These results suggest that there are differences, but also some similarities, between Austrian and non-Austrian negotiating behaviors. On the one hand, there is a certain degree of conformity between Austrian and others' negotiating behaviors. The behaviors of Austrian negotiators are not so distinct that they escape some of the regularities that negotiators and diplomats learn through their professional socialization, no matter what their country of origin. On the other hand, while alternative explanations can still be tested, there are some significant differences that appear to make Austrian behavior distinctive and suggest that there may be a special pattern of Austrian negotiating behavior. This profile of particular behavioral similarities and dissimilarities is characteristic of Austria; other countries might well exhibit different configurations of similarities and dissimilarities.

DISCUSSION

The portrait painted by these statistical results corroborates the profile described earlier and reveals a rather active, cooperative, and effective Austrian behavior. Austrians characteristically assign experienced negotiators who form cohesive delegations that operate in a decentralized fashion. They are clearly focused on broad mandates and key issues on which there is basic consensus among involved domestic agencies and social partners. Austrian negotiating teams typically are adequately prepared, receive sufficient information, and have the attention of high level Austrian officials who regularly track the negotiations. Austrians generally acknowledge that they are less powerful than their counterparts in a negotiation and, perhaps for that very reason, they behave within the negotiation process in a cooperative manner.

Austrians are problem-solvers and seek consensus both at home and at the bargaining table. They study issues and search for solutions that are mutually acceptable, rather than act competitively and strategically or seek win-lose outcomes. Austrians tend to be pragmatic, not ideological, negotiators, which make them flexible and willing to accept partial solutions when necessary instead of no agreement at all. Their aim is not necessarily "win-win," but "no lose." At the same time, Austrian negotiators are willing to "hang tough" and play tactically and competitively when the issues are strongly salient and the stakes for Austria are high. Austrian negotiators operate mainly through informal channels with other delegations and actively seek to develop coalitions and maintain friendly relations that facilitate joint problem-solving and search activities.

As a small and neutral Western nation, such a negotiating approach is not unexpected for Austria. It is an uncontroversial, work-within-the-system style. Given the power asymmetry Austria typically faces in international negotiation fora, Austria seeks to promote and maximize its national interests through this non-aggressive, informal, and problem-solving approach.

Austria's approach appears to have a positive and conciliatory effect on the outcome of negotiations. Austrian negotiating behavior is correlated with binding treaties and commitments, but commitments that only partially resolve the issues or problems at hand. Partial agreements avert stalemate and often institute a post-agreement negotiation process that continues to emphasize a problem-solving search dynamic to enhance and complete the agreement. Austria's negotiating conduct is well suited for this post-agreement process as well.

In summary, four basic questions need to be considered:

1. Is there an Austrian approach to negotiating?

Yes. Both the introspective and observational techniques revealed similar patterns of Austrian negotiating behavior that appear to be pervasive and persistent. Some key situational factors do result in variation from these basic behavioral patterns, but they are few. In fact, these situational findings can be viewed as subpatterns of the general Austrian approach to negotiations.

2. Is this Austrian approach unique or similar to a universal culture of negotiating?

This is a more difficult question to answer. Significant differences were found between eight Austrian and non-Austrian negotiating behaviors; similarities were found on nine behaviors. One might conclude from this that while the Austrian negotiating approach is distinctive in many ways, it is not unique; Austrian diplomats do share a common universal culture of negotiating with diplomats of other countries. Together, these similarities and differences in behavior define a special Austrian approach to negotiation that may differ from the profiles of other countries.

3. Is this Austrian approach efficacious in achieving Austrian interests?

Austria's "soft" approach to negotiation is seen, at the same time, as being highly attentive to its national interests. Mandated goals and objectives are usually achieved in bilateral and multilateral negotiations, though they may be secured through incremental post-agreement negotiation processes involving partial solutions. As well, while basic mandates are realized, the negotiated details for implementing agreements are often less acceptable to Austrian delegations.

4. Is this Austrian approach likely to be affected by the

changing international situation?
Yes. The end of the Cold War is likely to lessen Austria's role as mediator and facilitator between the superpowers in international negotiation fora. As well, within the context of EU coordination, Austria will be part of a permanent coalition and not a "freelancer" any more, thus transferring much of Austria's negotiation activity from the international negotiating table to the intra-coalitional context.

Those are the substantive results of the data analysis -- an empirically-based negotiation profile for Austria can be established. The other study objective was to test an approach that can identify and distinguish among national negotiating behaviors. The relatively simple statistical routines used in this study offer a straightforward procedure for describing, contrasting, and discriminating among particular national and general transnational behaviors. This statistical approach appears promising. What is most limiting in the short run is not the methodology, but the availability of data. First, the participant-generated data used to describe Austrian negotiating behavior may not portray Austrian actions and responses accurately. The basic problem is self-reporting. Other data collection approaches, as enumerated earlier, need to be exercised. Second, larger data bases are required. Analyses conducted over a broader set of negotiation cases -- both for the particular country under investigation as well as the comparison group -- may produce more representative and stable results. This would also provide a better sense of Austrian behavior in relation to other nations.

CONCLUSIONS

We began this paper with the assumption that being aware of

national negotiating behaviors is important, but that finding a systematic way of identifying them was required. From a practical perspective, trying to uncover such patterns is a real planning task that negotiators struggle with daily. The approach can help a negotiator to anticipate the behavior of a future counterpart in negotiation is influential in prenegotiation planning and strategizing. It can help to project likely responses to proposals and offers, and can help to anticipate probable offers that may be put on the table by the other side. Once negotiations commence, it can help to evaluate the risk, costs, and benefits of continuing to negotiate. It would be better if a multi-method approach were used to uncover such behavioral patterns; five different approaches were described earlier in this report.

Especially if negotiators are self-conscious of their own negotiating conduct, identifying the conduct of their counterparts may reveal critical interests, sensitivities, and peculiarities that can enhance or retract from their future interactions. From a positive perspective, this can help negotiators develop appropriate ways of working together effectively and designing formulas that are mutually acceptable. Negatively, negotiators potentially could use such information to take advantage of and exploit the other party.

Understanding one's own negotiating approach can be revealing too, but self awareness is not common. Patterns of past successes and past mistakes, effective and ineffective behaviors, can be an important teaching device in the professional training of negotiators and diplomats. Introspective analysis of one's own orientation to negotiation can help motivate reassessments which can improve the likelihood of agreement and the attainment of national interests, if they reveal the differences between effective and ineffective behaviors.

How might the results of this study be used in a practical fashion? One obvious application is in the training of negotiators and diplomats.

- The behavioral categories in the framework can offer a meaningful way of thinking of oneself and the other side when preparing for negotiations.

- The analytical results presented in this report can be employed as a point of departure for discussion on what is useful, not useful, and should be changed in typical Austrian approaches. Especially with the recent evolution of Austria's standing in the international community, such self-assessments should not only proceed in the classroom, but should occur at high levels in the Foreign Affairs Ministry as well.

Presently, negotiators have no practical technique to identify, describe, and compare national negotiating behaviors in an orderly, logical, and empirical way.[11] Convenient stereotyping often takes the place of systematic analysis. The empirical approach demonstrated in this study offers an alternative to culturally-loaded and impressionistic attempts at presenting national styles of negotiating. The methodology, in spite of all its shortcomings, is a feasible and portable choice for identifying and distinguishing among national negotiating behaviors.

[11] Several IIASA/PIN (Processes of International Negotiation) Project studies have sought to develop systematic approaches to describing and generalizing about national negotiating behaviors. See, for example, Druckman (1993), Spector (1993a, 1993b, and 1995 forthcoming).

What are the next steps? More research is called for to develop this methodology -- to generate adequate data bases, and experiment with alternate data collection and analysis procedures. The next steps include:

- oDeveloping a larger and more representative sample of Austrian cases to supplement the current opportunity sample.

- oConducting more cross-checking interviews with non-Austrians who have experience negotiating with Austrians.

- oExperimenting with improved categorization schemes and more sophisticated analytical approaches as the size of the data base increases.

- oConducting more systematic comparative analyses involving more nations and more comparisons.

REFERENCES

Alger, Chadwick (1961) "Non-Resolution Consequences of the United Nations and Their Effect on International Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* V, 2:128-145.

Binnendijk, Hans (1987) editor, *National Negotiating Styles.* Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State.

Cohen, Raymond (1991) *Negotiating Across Cultures*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Druckman, Daniel (1993) "A Comparative Methodology for Analyzing Negotiations," Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Working Paper WP-93-34 (July).

Druckman, Daniel and P. Terrence Hopmann (1989) "Behavioral Aspects of Negotiation on Mutual Security," in Philip Tetlock, et al., editors, *Behavior, Society and Nuclear War, Vol. I.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Faure, Guy Olivier and Gunnar Sjöstedt (1993) "Culture and Negotiation: An Introduction," in G.O. Faure and J. Z. Rubin, eds., *Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Goodman, L.A. and W.H. Kruskal (1954) "Measures of association for cross classification," *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 49: 732-764.

Kimmel, Paul (1994) "Cultural Perspectives on Negotiation," *Journal of Social Issues* 50,1: 179-196.

Lang, Winfried (1993) "A Professional's View," in G.O. Faure and J. Z. Rubin, eds., *Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Larsson, Per (1991) "Comparative Studies of International Negotiations," Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Processes of International Negotiation Project, unpublished paper (October).

Modelski, George (1970) "The World's Foreign Ministers: A Political Elite." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 14: 135-175.

Spector, Bertram I. (1993a) "International Negotiation Support Systems: Assessing the Need for Practical Tools," Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Working Paper WP-93-35 (July).

Spector, Bertram I. (1993b) editor, "Systems Support for International Negotiation: Implications for Application," Special Issue, *Theory and Decision* 34, 3 (May).

Spector, Bertram I. (1995) "Comparative Analyses of International Negotiations," Special Issue, *Group Decision and Negotiation* (forthcoming).

Whelen, J. G. (1979) "Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for U.S. Diplomacy." Report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Zartman, I. William (1989) "Prenegotiation: Phases and Functions," in Janice G. Stein, editor, *Getting to the Table: The Processes of International Prenegotiation*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Zartman, I. William and Maureen Berman (1982) *The Practical Negotiator*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

APPENDIX A

Guide to Introspective Interviews

APPENDIX B

Interview Guide for Systematic Data Collection Study

APPENDIX C

Negotiation Cases in the Sample

Austrian Cases

EFTA-EC Negotiations on a Common European Economic Area (1990-92)
EFTA-EC Negotiations on environmental issues (1990-92)
EFTA-EC Negotiations on scientific and technology issues (1990-92)
EFTA-Third Country negotiations
Preparatory meeting for the CSCE Council Ministerial Meeting, Stockholm (1992)
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro (1991-92)
Austria-Poland negotiations on the establishment of consular relations (1974-75)
CSCE, Helsinki (March-July 1992)
CSCE Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (1992)
Convention on Biodiversity (1991-92)
Transit agreement between Austria and the European Community (1988)
Austria-EC negotiations over membership
ECE Conference on Environmental Impact Assessments, Espoo (1988)
Negotiations in the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly
Negotiations in the Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly
Central European Initiative (1989-present)
Climate Change negotiations (1990-93)
Multilateral negotiations on Middle East Water Resources (1992-93)
Austria-Italy negotiations on transfrontier cooperation of local entities (1992)
ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
Socialist International Party Leaders' Conference
OECD Negotiations on Economic issues

Non-Austrian Cases

Using expert approach:

Egyptian-Israeli armistice (1949): Egyptian and Israeli perspectives
U.S.-Egyptian negotiations over foreign aid (1977): Egyptian perspectives
Andorra-European Community (EC) trade negotiations (1985-1990): Andorran perspectives
EC-European Free Trade Association (EFTA) negotiations on the European Economic Area (1989-92): EFTA perspectives
Mali-Burkina Faso negotiations (1985-86): Mali and Burkina Faso perspectives
Nepal-India water resource development negotiations (1979-1987, 1990-1993): Nepalese and Indian perspectives
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam negotiations: Slovakian perspective

Using secondary source approach:

Vienna Conventions on Notification and Assistance in Case of Nuclear Accident: Non-nuclear powers

U.S.-Canada acid rain negotiations: Canadian perspectives
Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (Prenegotiations): Eastern perspectives
Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (Negotiations): Nordic perspectives
GATT (Uruguay Round Prenegotiations): G-77 perspectives